Environmental Law—Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association: Limiting the Applicability of NEPA by unknown
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 13
January 1977
Environmental Law—Flint Ridge Development
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association: Limiting the
Applicability of NEPA
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship.
For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Environmental Law—Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association: Limiting the Applicability of NEPA, 13 Urb. L. Ann. 225
(1977)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol13/iss1/13
FLINT RIDGE DEVELOPMENT CO. v. SCENIC
RIVERS ASSOCIATION: LIMITING THE
APPLICABILITY OF NEPA
In response to the increasing concern about environmental degrada-
tion, Congress enacted the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
(NEPA).' NEPA requires all agencies of the federal government "to
the fullest extent possible" 2 to include in every proposal for legislation
and other major federal actions significantly affecting the environment
an environmental impact statement (EIS) discussing the consequences
and alternatives of the proposed action.3 Congress intended NEPA to
1. National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), §§ 101-105, 201-207, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347, (1970 & Supp. V 1975). For an excellent general discussion of
NEPA, see F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY Acr (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. For the legislative
history of NEPA, see H.R. REP. No. 91-378, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969); SENATE COMM.
ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT OF 1969,
S.REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969); 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2751-73
(1969).
NEPA is a Congressional statement of environmental policy setting forth the need to
achieve and preserve harmony in man's relationship to his physical surroundings, and to
promote efforts which will prevent environmental degradation. See NEPA § 101, 42
U.S.C. § 4321, 4331 (1970). NEPA directs that all federal agencies consider the environ-
mental consequences of their activities and incorporates action-forcing procedures de-
signed to assure that agencies adhere to the policies and goals of the Act. NEPA § 102, 42
U.S.C. § 4332 (1970). See note 2 and accompanying text infra. In addition, NEPA
created and defined the duties of the Council on Environmental Quality. See NEPA §§ 42
U.S.C. §§ 4341-4347 (1970).
Section 101 of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1970), reads in part:
(a) The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interre-
lations of all components of the natural environment, . . . declares that it is the
continuing policy of the Federal Government. . . to use all practicable means and
measures, . . . in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare,
[and] to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony ....(b) In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate
Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end . . . [that certain
broad national goals in the management of the environment may be attained].
For concise statement of the general policies and provisions of NEPA, see 115 CONG.
REC. 19008-13 (1969) (statement of Sen. Jackson). See also SENATE COMM. ON INTERIOR
AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, NATIONAL ENCIRONMENTAL POLICY Acr of 1969, S.REP. No.
91-296, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
3. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Section 102(2)(C) provides in
pertinent part:
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reorder national priorities 4 and to serve as a broad mandate to federal
agencies to consider the environmental consequences of their actions.5
Furthermore, the phrase "to the fullest extent possible" was added to
insure that each federal agency would comply with the procedural
directives of NEPA unless expressly prohibited from doing so by its
statutory authorization. 6
In Flint Ridge Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Association,7 the
United States Supreme Court jeopardized these goals by allowing
practical inconvenience alone to render NEPA's impact statement
directive completely inapplicable. Under the Interstate Land Sales Full
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (I) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted and
administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2) all
agencies of the Federal government shall...
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Fedejal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human envi-
ronment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the
proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment
and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall con-
sult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by
law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies
of such statement and the comments and view of the appropriate Federal, State,
and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and enforce environmental
standards, shall be made available to the President, the Council on Environmental
Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of Title 5, and shall accompany
the proposal through the existing agency review processes ...
"At the very least, NEPA is an environmental full disclosure law." Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759 (E.D. Ark. 1971), aff'd,
470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). See Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe,
472 F.2d 693 (2d Cir. 1972). The purpose of the EIS process is to alert both decisionmak-
ers and the general public to the potential environmental effects of proposed action and
to minimize adverse effects wherever possible. See 40 C.F.R. § 1500.2 (1975).
The "action-forcing" provision, added in § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970),
which requires all agencies to the fullest extent possible to prepare environmental impact
statements for all major federal actions, is the keystone of NEPA. It was incorporated
late in the legislative process in response to fears that NEPA would be ineffective unless
it included procedures designed to ensure implementation of its policies. This require-
ment has had a fundamental impact on the federal agency decision-making process. See
ANDERSON, Preface to ANDERSON, supra note 1, at vii. See also FISHER, Foreword to
ANDERSON, supra note 1, at v [hereinafter cited as FISHER].
4. See generally 115 CONG. REC. 19009 (1969) (remarks of Sen. Jackson).
5. See S. REP. No. 91-296, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1969).
6. See CONF. REP. ON S. 1075, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1969).
7. 96 S. Ct. 2430 (1976).
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Disclosure Act,' a disclosure statement will automatically become
effective within thirty days of filing unless the Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) finds that the statement is inaccurate
or incomplete on its face. 9 Justice Marshall, in a unanimous opinion,
declared that HUD was not required to prepare an EIS prior to allow-
ing a disclosure statement to become effective because there would be
a clear and fundamental conflict between HUD's statutory deadline
under the Disclosure Act and the inherent delay caused by preparation
of an EIS.10 The decision advances a theory of statutory conflict as a
means of circumventing NEPA's procedural mandates.
In Scenic Rivers, environmental groups concerned with potential
water pollution from a housing development along the Illinois River"
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1720 (1970). The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act was
passed in 1968 to prevent misrepresentation, deceit and other abusive practices in the
sale of land by requiring developers to make full public disclosure of information needed
by potential buyers. Under the Disclosure Act, before a developer can lawfully "make
use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate
commerce, or of the mails . . . to sell or lease any lot" he must have an effective
disclosure statement on file with HUD. Id. §§ 1703(A)-1703(A)(1).
The disclosure statement, or "Statement of Record" as it is referred to in the Act, id.
§ 1705, is to include various information concerning the property such as: names of the
interested parties, condition of title, price and terms of sale; sub-division description;
access to sewage, electricity, gas, other municipalities, and "such other information
... as the Secretary may require as being reasonably necessary or appropriate for the
protection of purchasers." Id. § 1705(12). By regulation, a Statement of Record must
include a Property Report. 24 C.F.R. § 17 10. 20(a)-. 20(e), .110 (1976). The Property
Report contains such of the information included in the Statement of Record as the
Secretary deems necessary, and "such other information as the Secretary may...
require as being necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of
purchasers." 15 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1970) (emphasis added). For general commentary on
the Disclosure Act, see CONF. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968), reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3053, 3066; Coffey & Welch, Federal Regulation of
Land Sales: Full Disclosure Comes Down to Earth, 21 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1969);
Ellis, Land Sales Full Disclosure Laws: Federal and Illinois, 60 ILL. B.J. 16 (1971); Note,
S. 275-The Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act, 21 RUTGERS L. REV. 714 (1967);
Note, Interstate Land Sales Regulation: The Case For an Expanded Federal Role, 6
U.MICH. J.L. REF. 511 (1973); 27 ARK. L. REV. 65 (1973).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1706 (1970) (emphasis added).
10. 96 S. Ct. at 2439.
11. Flint Ridge Development Co., one of the appellants, organized a housing de-
velopment covering 7,000 acres of land adjacent to the Illinois River in northeastern
Oklahoma. The river had been designated as a "scenic river" by the state and respond-
ents were non-profit corporations designed to protect the river and its environs which
many of their members use for outdoor recreation. If all 3,000 lots in the appellant's
subdivision were sold and developed there would be 3,000 septic tanks disposing refuse
into the Illinois River. Because of the porous nature of the soil in this area, the septic
tank seepage would pollute the riVer and destroy the environmental quality of the basin.
Respondents were concerned about this potential situation and sought to enjoin HUD's
1977]
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brought suit against HUD for failing to suspend the effective date of
the developer's disclosure statement pending preparation of an EIS.
12
The district court and the Tenth Circuit held that HUD's decision to
allow a disclosure statement to become effective constituted a "major
Federal action" 13 within the meaning of NEPA and that HUD, there-
fore, was required to prepare an EIS prior to taking such action.1 4 On
appeal to the Supreme Court, appellants asserted that even if HUD's
decision was a major federal action, it would be impossible 15 for HUD
approval of the developer's disclosure statement. See Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 382
F. Supp. 69, 71-73 (E.D. Okla. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'dsub nom.
Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 96 S. Ct. 2430 (1976).
12. 96 S. Ct. at 2435.
13. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). Under this section there must
be a major federal action significantly affecting the human environment before NEPA's
impact statement requirement is applicable. Courts have construed this category to
include a wide range of agency activities. See, e.g., Scientists Institute for Public
Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (AEC's research and develop-
ment program as a whole); Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) (approval of a
lease on Indian lands); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827
(D.C. Cir. 1972) (sale of off-shore oil lands); Greene County Planning Bd. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1972) (granting of a license to construct high
voltage power line); Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 849 (1972) (construction of highways); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 337 F. Supp. 287 (D.D.C. 1971) (construction of a dam); Izaak Walton League
of America v. Schlesinger, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) (issuing of interim
operating license for nuclear power plant). For an excellent discussion of the kinds of
activities that have been found to be major federal actions, see ANDERSON, supra note 1,
at 56-105. See also Note, Major Federal Actions Under the National Environmental
Policy Act, 44 FoRDHAM L. REV. 580 (1975); 7 CONN. L. REV. 733 (1975); 29 OKLA. L.
REV. 165 (1975); 124 U.PA. L. REV. 250 (1975); 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 485.
14. Both the district court and the court of appeals, based their decisions on Davis v.
Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972) and Scientists' Institute for Public Information,
Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir. 1973), which held that where a federal license or
permit is involved, or where Congress has exercised its plenary power of regulation
under the commerce clause, or other constitutional authority, federal approval consti-
tutes major federal action. The lower courts found NEPA's impact statement require-
ment to be applicable because the approval of a filing under the Disclosure Act is in the
nature of a federal license or permit to lawfully engage in sales in interstate commerce.
See Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 243-44 (10th Cir. 1975), aff'g 382 F.
Supp. 69, 75 (E.D. Okla. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers
Ass'n, 96 S. Ct. 2430 (1976).
15. Preparation and circulation of an impact statement is a notoriously lengthy
process. Impact statements on simple projects may take from three to five months to
complete, even by experienced personnel. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY,
SixTH ANNUAL REPORT 639 (1976). Impact statements on complex projects prepared by
inexperienced personnel may take up to 18 months to draft. Once the drafting is
completed, the statements are submitted to other agencies for comments. Those agen-
cies have 45 days to make their comments. For the Council on Environmental Quality
(CEQ) timetable of the impact statement process, see 40 C.F.R. § 1500 (1973).
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to comply with both NEPA's impact statement directive and the Dis-
closure Act's deadline. 16 The Supreme Court agreed and reversed,
holding that the inconsistency between NEPA and the Disclosure Act
excused HUD from preparation of an EIS.17
NEPA generally requires that a federal agency prepare an environ-
mental impact statement prior to taking action that constitutes a major
federal action significantly affecting the environment. 18 There are,
however, instances where the preparation of an EIS will not be re-
quired because the mandate need only be complied with "to the fullest
extent possible."' 9 In the uncertainty surrounding early efforts to
implement NEPA, courts generally gave a narrow reading to the
phrase "to the fullest extent possible," requiring only limited adher-
ence to NEPA.20 This trend was reversed by the forceful opinion in
Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee v. Atomic Energy Commis-
sion.21 Courts have since construed the phrase to demand strict com-
pliance with NEPA. 22 In Calvert Cliffs', the Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia stressed that this language "does not provide an
escape hatch for footdragging agencies"13 but demands that procedural
duties imposed by NEPA be complied with to the utmost unless they
clearly conflict with other statutory authority applicable to the agen-
cy.24 The court noted that agencies are not to construe their authorizing
16. 96 S. Ct. at 2437.
17. Id. at 2439.
18. See note 13 supra.
19. NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
20. See Daly v. Volpe, 326 F. Supp. 868, 870 (W.D. Wash. 1972); Sierra Club v.
Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 99, 125-26 (D. Alas. 1971). In Daly no impact statement had been
submitted prior to approval of a highway location, but there had been hearings and
meetings about the project. In addition two studies of proposed routes had been under-
taken. The court held this to be substantial compliance with NEPA. 326 F. Supp. at 870.
In Sierra Club v. Hardin, informal environmental studies performed by applicants for
Forest Service projects were held to be sufficient to meet the service's duty to prepare
an impact statement under NEPA. 325 F. Supp. at 125-26. See also ANDERSON, supra
note 1, at 52.
21. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
22. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 49. See, e.g., Louisiana v. Federal Power Comm'n,
503 F.2d 844, 874-77 (5th Cir. 1974); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
476 F.2d 142, 150-51 (5th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287, 292 (1st Cir. 1973);
Monroe County Conservation Council, Inc. v. Volpe, 472 F.2d 693, 697 (2d Cir. 1972);
Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593 (3d Cir. 1972); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1175-77 (6th Cir. 1972); Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1138 (4th Cir.
1971); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 695, 700
(D.D.C. 1974); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 257 (D. Wash. 1972).
23. 449 F.2d at 1114.
24. Id. at 1115. The Calvert Cliffs' court relied on the legislative history of NEPA.
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
legislation narrowly so as to avoid compliance with NEPA25 and that
considerations of administrative difficulty or delay will not suffice to
deny NEPA's "action-forcing" provisions their intrinsic importance. 26
The Calvert Cliffs' approach has been widely accepted as the definitive
judicial stance on NEPA.27
When faced with statutory conflict questions involving NEPA,
courts have examined the underlying purposes and practical applica-
tions of the two ostensibly irreconcilable acts to determine whether a
real conflict, within the confines of the Calvert Cliffs' doctrine, is
presented.28 NEPA's impact statement requirement has been upheld
when courts have found the conflict to be nonexistent.29 In Ely v.
Velde, 30 the Fourth Circuit was confronted with an apparent conflict
between preparation of an EIS and the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration's (LEAA) obligations under the Organized Crime Con-
trol and Safe Streets Act. 31 The Act provides block grants to states for
various law enforcement purposes. Funds are to be allocated with a
minimal number of federal conditions attached. 32 LEAA argued that
under the Safe Streets Act's "hands off" policy it was precluded from
requiring submission of environmental information by the states to
enable the agency to draft an impact statement. 33 The court held that
there was no antagonism between the policies of NEPA and the Safe
Streets Act because Congress intended the "hands off" provision only
to prevent the creation of a federal police force and not to preclude
consideration of environmental consequences. 34 Thus, the court found
The guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) contain similar
language. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.4 (1973).
25. 499 F.2d at 1115. The court here quoted from the language of the drafters of the
"fullest extent possible" phrase. The drafters stated in pertinent part:
The purpose of this new language is to make it clear that each agency of the Federal
government shall comply with [the procedural directions of NEPAl unless the
existing law applicable to such agency's operations expressly prohibits or makes
full compliance impossible . . . and . . . no agency shall utilize an excessively
narrow construction of its existing statutory authorizations to avoid compliance.
CONF. REP. ON S.1075, H.R. REP. No. 91-765, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 9 (1969).
26. 449 F.2d at 1115.
27. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at 247. See, e.g., note 22 supra and cases cited therein.
28. E.g., Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir.
1973).
29. E.g., Louisiana v. Federal Power Comm'n, 503 F.2d 844, 873-77 (5th Cir. 1974);
Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130, 1134-37 (4th Cir. 1971).
30. 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971).
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3701-3795 (1970).
32. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 3733, 3757, 3766(a) (1970).
33. 451 F.2d at 1135.
34. Id.
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that filing an EIS was obligatory.3"
In Louisiana v. Federal Power Commission,36 the Fifth Circuit rec-
onciled the Natural Gas Act 37 with NEPA.38 The Natural Gas Act
requires the Federal Power Commission (FPC) to promulgate perma-
nent curtailment plans to allocate scarce natural gas supplies in a
manner that protects consumers from discriminatory practices by gas
companies. 39 The court rejected the FPC's claim that a plan con-
structed to meet the agency's duty under the Natural Gas Act would
not be predictable enough to lend itself to analysis by impact state-
ment" and held the impact statement directive was applicable, noting
that NEPA only requires the FPC to prepare the best impact statement
possible. 41
In a variety of cases, however, courts have determined the conflict
between agency duties under NEPA and under their primary statutory
authority to be clear and unavoidable. 42 In these instances conform-
ance with the impact statement mandate has not been required. Courts
have found such irreconcilable conflicts to exist in cases involving
emergency legislation or other laws calling for prompt or temporary
agency action in order to protect the public welfare.43 The courts have
determined that the congressional purposes underlying the acts in-
35. Id.
36. 503 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1974).
37. 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970).
38. 503 F.2d at 876.
39. See 15 U.S.C. 717(d) (1970).
40. 503 F.2d at 876.
41. Id.
42. See, e.g., Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144 (1st Cir. 1975);
Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974); Dry Color Mfg. Ass'n v.
Department of Labor, 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973); Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337 F. Supp. 1236
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
43. See, e.g., Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144 (Ist Cir. 1975) (an
impact statement was not required prior to termination of the federally assisted status of
a hospital due to noncompliance with fire safety regulations, under the Health Insurance
for the Aged Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1395pp (1970)); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Simon, 502 F.2d
1154 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (no impact statement was required prior to the institution of
mandatory crude oil allocations under the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,
15 U.S.C. § 751-756 (Supp. III 1973) (amended 1975)); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973) (the impact statement requirement was held
inapplicable to promulgation, during a gas shortage, of interim gas curtailment plans
under the Natural Gas Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717-717w (1970)); Cohen v. Price Comm'n, 337
F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (authorization of a subway and bus fare increase under
the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (Supp. 11971) was not required
to be preceded by the drafting of an impact statement).
1977]
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volved would be frustrated by the implementation of the time consum-
ing impact statement directive."4 In Dry Color Manufacturers'Associa-
tion v. Department of Labor,45 the Third Circuit declared that the duty
imposed on the Department of Labor by the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA) was inconsistent with preparation of an impact
statement. 46 Under OSHA, the Department of Labor is obligated to
protect employees from health hazards and is authorized to promulgate
temporary standards toward this end. 47 The court held that the Depart-
ment of Labor need not complete the lengthy impact statement process
prior to issuing emergency temporary standards under the Act, limiting
employee exposure to possible carcinogens because to do so would be
contrary to the expressed intent of OSHA. 48
In another group of cases the impact statement mandate has been
held inapplicable because the allegedly conflicting act requires the
functional equivalent of NEPA's environmental assessment proce-
dures. 49 For example, under the Clean Air Act" the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) is to promulgate standards of performance
44. See, e.g., Milo Community Hosp. v. Weinberger, 525 F.2d 144 (Ist Cir. 1975) (the
court held that Congress in the Health Insurance for the Aged Act intended a hospital's
federally assisted status to be terminated promptly upon a finding of noncompliance with
fire standards, and without consideration of environmental effects of termination); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Simon, 502 F.2d 1154 (Emer. Ct. App. 1974) (where it was determined that
Congress' purpose in enacting the Emergency Petroleum Act of 1973 was to authorize
immediate agency action to avoid the paralyzing results of a nationwide shortage of
crude oil); Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n, 476 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1973)
(the court held that the Natural Gas Act required immediate interim curtailment action in
the emergency situation presented by a national gas shortage); Cohen v. Price Comm'n,
337 F. Supp. 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (the purpose of the Economic Stabilization Act was
found to be the prompt stabilization of the nation's troubled economy).
45. 486 F.2d 98 (3d Cir. 1973).
46. Id. at 108.
47. Id. at 101, 108.
48. Id. at 108. The court also noted that although this is a sacrifice of NEPA's policy
it is mitigated by the fact that emergency standards must be replaced by permanent
standards within six months and those would have to be preceded by preparation of an
impact statement.
49. See, e.g., Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839 (7th Cir. 1975); Amoco
Oil Co. v. EPA, 501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus,
486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C.
Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. EPA, 489 F.2d 1247 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Anaconda Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 482 F.2d 1301 (10th Cir. 1973). With regards to the Clean
Air Act, the question of the application of NEPA is no longer one of judicial determina-
tion. The Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 specifically says:
"No action taken under the Clean Air Act shall be deemed a major Federal action
significantly affecting the environment within the meaning of [NEPA]."
15 U.S.C. § 793(C)(1) (Supp. IV 1974).
50. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857a-1857d (1970).
[Vol. 13:225
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governing emission of air pollutants by stationary sources. The Clean
Air Act requires the regulations to reflect the "best system of emission
reduction" and orders EPA to weigh the costs of attaining such reduc-
tion. 5' In Portland Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus,52 the District
of Columbia Circuit held that this process was procedurally and funda-
mentally equivalent to the environmental impact statement process
and served the same purpose of alerting the public and Congress to the
environmental implications of proposed agency action. Thus an EIS
was not required.
5 3
The Supreme Court considered Scenic Rivers in light of this back-
ground. The Court first chose to avoid the "major Federal action"
issue and concentrated on the alleged statutory conflict.5 4 Recognizing
that NEPA is to be strictly applied unless there is an unavoidable
conflict, the Court construed the Disclosure Act to permit HUD to
suspend the effective date of a disclosure statement only to allow the
51. Id. § 1857c-6.
52. 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (plaintiffs challenged promulgation of stationary
standards for portland cement plants on the grounds of failure to prepare an impact
statement).
53. Id. at 386.
54. A finding of "major Federal action" is necessary in order for the impact state-
ment requirement to apply, see note 3 and accompanying text supra. In fact the lower
courts had decided the case on this issue, see notes 13-14 and accompanying text supra.
To many this was the significance of the case, see [1976 Current Dev.] ENVIR. REP.
(BNA) 2143 (Apr. 23, 1976) (Scenic Rivers was referred to as presenting the Supreme
Court with the question of what constitutes a major federal action).
There are a number of probable reasons for the Supreme Court's decision to avoid the
major federal action question. Traditionally "major Federal action" has been defined by
the lower courts. A holding in Scenic Rivers based on major federal action would have
had wide implications. If the Court had decided that this was a major federal action, the
concept of major federal action would have been expanded almost to the point of
including any federal action. This would have been highly undesirable from a public
policy standpoint, for the resulting administrative burden would have been crushing. Not
only would HUD have had to prepare impact statements for the 7,000 filings it had on
record at the time, see [1976 Current Dev.] ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 2143 (Apr. 26, 1976), but,
in addition, due to the similarity of actions under the Securities Act of 1933, the
Securities and Exchange Commission would also have been required to comply. Further-
more, as a result of this expanded definition of major federal action, it is probable that
many similar non-discretionary federal actions would have required preparation of an
impact statement.
Had the Court held there was no major federal action, it would have created the first
barricade to the broadening lower court definition of "major federal action." In so
doing, some federal actions which have a tremendous effect on the environment might
have been effectively removed from the realm of NEPA if they could be likened to
HUD's action under the Disclosure Act.
By deciding the case on the statutory conflict basis the Court may have felt that it
could limit its holding to the facts of Scenic Rivers and thereby avoid an upheaval of the
evolving major federal action doctrine.
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developer to remedy inadequacies in the statement and concluded that
NEPA did not implicitly grant HUD the power to suspend an adequate
disclosure statement pending preparation of an EIS.55 In addition, the
Court noted that it was inconceivable that the impact statement proc-
ess of drafting, commentary and revision could be completed within
thirty days. 56 Since HUD could not simultaneously comply with its
duties under both statutes, 57 the Court held NEPA to be inapplicable. 58
Clearly Scenic Rivers does not present the type of statutory conflict
commonly accepted to excuse an agency from preparation of an EIS.
The Disclosure Act is neither functionally equivalent environmental
55. 96 S. Ct. at 2439. The Court refused to accept plaintiffs' argument that HUD has
the inherent power under the Disclosure Act to suspend the effective date of a disclosure
statement past the 30 day deadline in order to allow time to prepare an impact statement.
This argument had been accepted by the Tenth Circuit, where the court based its
conclusion on the fact that no provision of the Disclosure Act prohibited the agency
from suspending a statement pending preparation of an impact statement. The Supreme
Court, in rejecting plaintiffs' contention, relied on United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S.
669 (1973), which held that NEPA was not meant to impliedly repeal any other act.
56. 96 S. Ct. at 2438. See note 15 supra.
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2439. The Court did suggest that HUD might have some duties under
NEPA that could be carried out within the confines of the Disclosure Act. Id. at 2439-40.
For, under 15 U.S.C. § 1705(12)(1970) and 15 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1970) HUD was empow-
ered to require the inclusion of environmental information in the developer's disclosure
statement if it was deemed to be necessary for the protection of purchasers and in the
public interest. See generally note 8 supra.
In Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689 (D.D.C. 1974),
plaintiffs brought suit to direct the Securities and Exchange Commission to require each
corporation within its mandate to provide the Commission with information concerning
the environmental consequences of its corporate action. Under the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1970), SEC has authority to include in registration state-
ments "such other information as the Commissioner deems necessary or appropriate in
the public interest or for the protection of investors." The court held that superimposed
on this grant of broad rule making authority to the Commission is the over-riding
congressional mandate of NEPA to protect and enhance the environment. The court
found a congressional resolve that dissemination of environmental information is impor-
tant to the purposes of NEPA, and therefore, ordered the Commission to modify its
regulations in accordance with that principle.
The Disclosure Act was fashioned after the Securities Act of 1933. 96 S. Ct. at 2433. In
fact, the provision on which Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. was based is
almost identical to 15 U.S.C. § 1707(a) (1970). This suggests that, had the Scenic Rivers
plaintiffs chosen to be a bit more conservative in their approach to the suit, they might
have been more successful. Had they challenged HUD's failure to require disclosure of
the environmental effects of a developer's project, instead of seeking the preparation of
an impact statement, the Court may have been more willing to act in their favor. HUD
might then have been required to at least partially comply with NEPA; as it stands now,
HUD's actions under the Disclosure Act are exempted from NEPA's mandate. In fact,
the Scenic Rivers Court recognized this deficiency in plaintiffs' complaint when it
inferred that HUD might have some obligations under NEPA.
58. 96 S. Ct. at 2438.
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legislation 59 nor does it require emergency agency action.60 Although a
cursory reading of the Disclosure Act lends support to the Court's
conclusion that the statutory duties thereunder are inconsistent with
preparation of an EIS, 61 the background and practical applications of
the two acts involved in Scenic Rivers demonstrate the superficiality of
the Court's approach.
Had the Court scrutinized the congressional purposes and realistic
effects of the Disclosure Act and NEPA in the light of the widely
accepted maxim that two ostensibly conflicting statutes should be
reconciled if at all possible,62 it could have reached the contrary con-
clusion that there was no real conflict of duties. Congress intended
strict adherence to NEPA's procedural directives, including the EIS
requirement, in order to force each federal agency to consider the
environmental effects of its actions "to the fullest extent possible"
and to disclose that information to other federal officials and the
public. 63 The primary goal of the Disclosure Act is to protect purchas-
ers from fraudulent practices by developers in the interstate sale of
land. 64 The thirty-day deadline was designed to shield developers from
costly delays that might result from the need to register with HUD, 65
although in actual practice few disclosure statements become effective
within thirty days of filing despite the statutory deadline.6
The Court could have avoided a finding of statutory conflict by
adopting either of two possible statutory constructions. It could have
interpreted the Disclosure Act to allow HUD to suspend the effective
date of the disclosure statement pending preparation of the EIS. The
primary goal of the Disclosure Act, the protection of purchasers,
59. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra.
60. See notes 43-48 and accompanying text supra.
61. The Disclosure Act literally gives the Secretary of HUD the power to suspend
only inaccurate or incomplete statements. See note 8 supra.
62. See note 28 and accompanying text supra.
63. See notes 1-6 and accompanying text supra.
64. SEE CONF. REP. No. 1785, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); 114 CONG. REc. 15272
(1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
65. See 96 S. Ct. at 2439.
66. More than 90% of disclosure statements receive suspension notices deferring
their effective dates. Chasnow, Compliance with NEPA in Interstate Land Sales, URB.
LAND 12, 13 (May 1975). In fact the developer in Scenic Rivers first filed his disclosure
statement on February 5, 1974 and it did not become effective until May 4, 1975. Scenic
Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 242 (10th Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom. Flint Ridge Dev.
Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n, 96 S. Ct. 2430 (1976). Thus, here, as in many cases, HUD
would have had sufficient time to complete the impact statement process.
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would not have been thwarted by such a suspension.67 Such a delay
would harm only the secondary purpose of safeguarding the economic
interests of the developer. Given this background and the express
legislative goal that NEPA be widely applied," it is doubtful that
Congress intended a developer's economic interest to override the
public interest in a healthful environment.
In the alternative, the Court could have interpreted NEPA to require
only that HUD prepare the best possible EIS in the time the agency
was allowed under the Disclosure Act. Since public disclosure to the
public of the potential impact of human activities on the environment is
one of the principal purposes of NEPA, the Court should not have
limited its options to either a complete EIS or no EIS but should have
considered a partially complete EIS. Some environmental information
could be collected within the initial thirty day period. In fact, since
most disclosure statements require at least sixty days to become effec-
tive, 69 detailed consideration of environmental impacts would be possi-
ble in most situations.
In failing to reconcile the two statutes in Scenic Rivers, the Court
created a new category of exemptions under which an agency may be
excused from compliance with NEPA when performance of its statu-
tory duties might conflict with the preparation of an EIS. Therefore
NEPA may be held inapplicable despite the fact that the statutory
conflict is merely administrative inconvenience. After Scenic Rivers,
any agency could argue that NEPA's EIS requirement is inapplicable
whenever the agency is subject to a statutory deadline designed to
expedite agency action.70 The ultimate effect of Scenic Rivers, of
course, remains undetermined. The decision may be treated as an
aberrant interpretation of NEPA, with its impact limited to the facts of
67. In fact the full disclosure purpose of the legislation might be enhanced by
requiring disclosure of environmental information. This type of data may be of major
value to "ethical" purchasers who are concerned with preservation of the environment.
68. See note 25 supra.
69. See note 66 supra.
70. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 5304(f) (Supp. IV 1974) (where an application for a grant
under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 is to be considered
approved within 75 days after receipt unless Secretary informs applicant of reasons for
disapproval); id. § 2182 (1970) (where the Commissioner of Patents is allowed to issue
patents on inventions for use and production of nuclear materials to private applicants
unless within 90 days after receipt of a copy of the application the Atomic Energy
Commission directs the Commissioner to issue the patent to the Commission instead
because of public interest in the invention); 15 U.S.C. § 77h(a), (b) (1970) (where a
registration statement filed pursuant to the Securities Act of 1933 is deemed effective
within 20 days of filing unless found to be inaccurate or incomplete on its face).
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the case. The decision may, however, effectively narrow the applica-
bility of the action-forcing EIS requirement which is the "heart of
NEPA. ' ' 71 Such an interpretation would be particularly severe since
the principal goals of NEPA have been accomplished through the
impact statement requirement. 72 Without a mandate for strict com-
pliance with the EIS directive, it is possible that NEPA will cease to
have an effect on agency decisionmaking and will become, as the
drafters once feared, "a mere noble statement of purpose. '73
Maria A. Weiner
71. FISHER, supra note 3, at v.
72. ANDERSON, supra note 1, at vii.
73. FISHER, supra note 3, at v.
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